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THE WORD "HIJACK" apparently has no roots in the King's
English, originating completely in America. It was widely used
among members of the International Workers of the World during
its heyday from 1912 to 1920 and originally meant a member of a
band of hobos who preyed on harvesters of the Midwest and Northwest
United States. It was also used as a general synonym for holdup.'
"Hijack" first developed as an interjection, a command given
by robbers to their victims. It meant: "Hold your hand up high,
Jack!"' The use of the word spread in America following the repeal
of prohibition during which era the term was applied to those who
robbed bootleggers of their wares. 3 At that time the accepted spelling
became "hijack" instead of "highjack." The word also was applied
to those who held up trucks.
4
"Hijack" has become very widely used, especially in the slang of
criminals, and has developed many meanings, some of them sexual.
It has been broadly used to mean the use of coercion or trickery to
force individuals to do what they do not want to do5 and has become
descriptive of the holding up, robbery, or seizing of aircraft. In 1961
the weekly news magazines in the United States popularized the term
"skyjacker" for air pirates.6 However, the official usage remains
hijacker unless the more specific term of air pirate is used.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HIJACKING - THE
EARLIEST AIR PIRATES
The threat of air piracy has been a serious one from the earliest
days of air commerce. An early book entitled Aerial Transport,
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contained a section designated "Flying Pirates," wherein the author
recounted the story of a dashing criminal who intended to establish
himself on some remote island in the Pacific and prey on commercial
aircraft as soon as routes were established.' On his camouflaged
island, he would listen by wireless to learn the movements of the air-
craft which he intended to hold up. The author did not think the
scheme would work because the pirate would have to land the aircraft
somewhere and "he would then find that aerial law has a phenomenally
long arm, and that a net of observations and detection would speedily
enmesh him."'
One of the earliest airlines facing active aerial piracy was the
French Lignes Lat~co~re during the years 1923-26 when it was
establishing air carrier service across the Spanish Sahara.9 The desert
was infested by pillards (pillagers) who lay in wait for any airplane
in distress. They would seize the aircraft, torture and murder the
crew, or hold them for ransom. 10 The tribesmen would also shoot at
the planes as they flew over the desert." As a result there was once
a mutiny of the pilots at Casablanca who refused to fly the dangerous
stretch of desert.'
2
On July 22, 1925, two French pilots, after a forced landing, had a
shoot-out with a band of attacking Moors and killed two of them.
In December 1925, pilot Marcel Reine was taken prisoner in the
desert and only released after payment of an exorbitant ransom.'
In 1926, Jean Mermoz, another French pilot, was captured, locked
up in a cage, and transported across the desert for days. He was
released for a ransom of 1000 pesetas. 4 On November 11, 1926,
pilots Gourp and Erable and mechanic Pintado were attacked by
tribesmen after a forced landing in the desert.' Due to the threat
of the pillards, the airplanes always flew in pairs so one could rescue
the other, and Erable had landed to rescue Gourp and Pintado. Erable
and Pintado were killed outright in the attack. Gourp was wounded
and carried off by the attackers. In captivity he attempted suicide
by drinking iodine. Although he was rescued after payment of the
"usual ransom," he died later.
There were a number of other pilots held for ransom which
was paid, usually after negotiation through friendly Arab intermedi-
7. G. THOMAS, AERIAL TRANSPORT 218-19 (1920).
8. Id.
9. R. CHAMBE, HISTOIRE DE L'AVIATION 304-10 (1948).
10. A. DE SAINT-ExuP-RY, WIND, SAND AND STARS 40-47, 127 (1939).
11. Id. at 138.
12. R. RUMBOLD & M. STEWART, THE WINGED LIFE 43 (1950).
13. Id. at 65.
14. Id. at 65-66.
15. Id. at 66.
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aries. In June 1927, pilots Reine and Serre were captured. A million
guns, a million sheep, and 5 million pesetas were demanded as ransom
for their release. After negotiating for 117 days, the ransom was
eventually reduced to a reasonable figure and paid.' 6 Eventually the
head of the airline operations in Africa tried to minimize the attacks
on the aircraft through parleys and negotiations with local sheiks.' 7
During 1930 and 1931 a number of revolutions swept through
South America breaking out in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and
finally Chile. Pilot Tom Jardine was seized at Arequipa and forced
to ferry an armed band of revolutionists to Tacna, Peru. Upon landing
he managed to escape on foot to Chile.'" Pilot Byron Rickards was
ordered, at gunpoint, to fly revolutionists from Pisco to Lima, Peru.
He refused to do so and somehow managed to avoid being killed.'
In 1930, in Brazil, an excited passenger drew a gun and was rapped
over the head with a pyrene bottle by the flight mechanic. 20 In 1931,
a Pan American Sikorsky was "kidnapped" by a mechanic and taken
to a revolutionary band which 2 days later, flew it into a mountain.
2 1
In that year there was even an armed confrontation between two air-
lines in the "Battle of Lake Montenegro." A Pan American aircraft
made an emergency landing at the installation of a rival airline at
Lake Montenegro in Brazil. When they attempted to refuel, the rival
airline agent trained his rifle on the Pan American pilot and ordered
him to leave.
22
Consequently, the airlines in South America had to take extensive
precautions because of the threats of the revolutionary groups.2' At
times it was necessary to give radio warnings so the aircraft could
make emergency landings at certain secret island berths to avoid
being captured by the revolutionists.24 At one time in 1931, Pan
American's operations were brought to a complete standstill by a
revolution in Brazil, and most of its personnel had to be discharged.25
Another area where commercial aircraft were subject to the
threat of violent attacks was China in the early 1930's when Pan
American was beginning its penetration of that region.26 An early
Pan American survey flight there narrowly escaped capture by
16. Id. at 71.
17. Id. at 43.
18. B. DAY, GLACIER PILOT 51 (1957).
19. Id. Pilot Rickards was subsequently hijacked in El Paso, Texas, on
August 3, 1961.
20. W. GROOCH, WINGED HIGHWAY 91 (1938).
21. Id. at 158-59.
22. Id. at 97; M. JOSEPHSON, EMPIRE OF THE AIR 74-75 (1944).
23. M. JOSEPHSON, supra note 22, at 86.
24. Id. at 87.
25. W. GROOCH, supra note 20, at 122-23.
26. Id. at 219.
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Chinese pirates and it was concluded that any plane forced down
along the China coast would be in grave danger unless armed with a
machine gun .2  This precaution was prompted by the many river
pirates who made life unsafe beyond the city limits. Pirate gangs
often looted vessels along the coast and held the wealthier passengers
for ransom. Typically, several well-dressed members of the gang
would book passage on the boat. When abreast the pirate rendezvous,
they would draw their weapons and force the captain to divert to the
spot where the pirates lay in wait.2" As a result of these naval hijack-
ings, it was believed by airline personnel that a major attraction of air
flight to the Chinese was its greater safety from the pirate attacks.29
Nevertheless, in 1931, one of the planes of Eurasia Aviation
Corporation was shot down by Mongol irregulars in Outer Mongolia.
The two pilots were captured, imprisoned, and tortured. They were
released months later after extended diplomatic negotiations."
The concept of a lone passenger "hijacking" an airplane instead
of a steamer was well known in China in 1933 when a CNAC Sikorsky
disappeared mysteriously. Chinese newspapers speculated that a pas-
senger, in league with the Communists, had shoved a gun against the
pilot's neck and forced him to fly to some rendezvous. However, this
was contradicted by the later finding of some of the plane's wreckage
in the water."'
One airline in post-World War II Alaska used to "frisk" the
passengers on some flights and take away all their guns, knives, and
booze.32 The pilot had a 5-cell flashlight filled with shot ready to
deal with any uncooperative passengers who objected to being frisked.
Pilots also carried guns as part of their regular flight equipment and
locked the cabin door. When the passengers were heard to be fighting,
the pilot would just pull back on the stick and smack the passengers
back into their seats. To quiet unruly drunks, the crew would put on
their oxygen masks and go up until the drunks passed out. 3
As can be seen, airlines from the very earliest days have had to
face the threat of violent attacks on their aircraft. The nature of
these attacks has changed with the years, but there seems to have been
a fairly regular and continuous evolution in the nature and modus
operandi of individuals or groups attacking and seizing control of
commercial aircraft for various purposes. Modern hijacking did not
27. Id. at 168.
28. Id. at 219.
29. Id.
30. Forman, China Spreads Her Wings, AvlATION, May 1936, at 12.
31. W. GROOCI, supra note 20, at 240-41.
32. B. DAY, supra note 18, at 295.
33. Id. at 296.
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spring suddenly out of the blue, but has a long line of antecedents as
do most social phenomena. It is interesting that seizure of aircraft for
ransom is one of the very oldest and yet also one of the most recent
types of armed attack on commercial aircraft.
III. STUDIES OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF HIJACKERS
A. Psychological Characteristics of Hijackers
In order to cope with the problem of air piracy or hijacking of
aircraft, we had to determine: what kinds of people do the hijacking;
how they go about it; why they do it; and what might be done to
prevent it. Hijacking of United States aircraft to a country of refuge
should be considered as an irrational act carried out by irrational, but
not necessarily insane, people.
In several cases there have been hijacking attempts with no
apparent destination. The act of hijacking is nonutilitarian. The
essential gratification to the hijacker is from an act of high drama,
a brief moment of glory and power for a previously ineffectual and
unsuccessful individual. It is analogous to a dramatic suicide such as
self-immolation by fire, to committing a sensational crime of violence,
or to carrying out a coup against one's enemies. The common denomi-
nator is the attention and publicity received.
The original studies concerning the psychological nature of hi-
jackers led to the conclusion that as a group they are neither very
resourceful nor very determined. 4 They also seem to be a very differ-
ent sort of social subgroup than that represented by the usual air
traveler. The usual air traveler is a successful member of society.
Hijackers, as a group, represent the failures in society. To the extent
that this difference between the two populations exists, one can capi-
talize on it by setting up criteria which differentiate the two popula-
tions and use these criteria as a basis for a differential screening
program, concentrating the screening on those types of individuals
most likely to represent a threat.
Various kinds of information had been recorded on past hijackers
and was studied in the development of the behavioral profile." It was
anticipated that this information would indicate that hijackers, although
falling into several different types, would be distinctively different
from the general population and have characteristics found in a very
small proportion of the air passenger population. It was expected
34. FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
DETERRENCE OF AIR PIRACY pt. II (1973) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
35. Id.
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that this knowledge could be extremely useful in narrowing the focus
on the types of individuals most likely to attempt to hijack United
States aircraft. It could also help to indicate steps that might reduce
the motivation for hijacking.
B. Methodological Problems
In studying hijackers one encounters a serious methodological
dilemma. One can employ extensive interview and clinical procedures
with those hijackers who may be available or use statistical procedures
on all cases, studying the information about them that has been docu-
mented after the hijacking. The latter procedure was utilized. Differ-
ing conclusions may sometimes be reached from the two types of
study, but it is believed that the differing conclusions are more a
result of the nature of the sample available for interview rather than
a result of the different procedures for study. A study of the informa-
tion about those hijackers who are available for possible interview
study indicates that their cases comprise a sample that differs in
most respects from the total group of hijackers.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BEHAVIORAL PROFILE
FOR HIJACKERS
A. Objective Criteria of Behavior
A number of objective criteria of behavior were established and
experimentally utilized in various combinations at various airports. A
metal detector adapted for passenger screening on the basis of field
trials was used for weapons detection. It was, of course, necessary to
utilize only simple objective criteria that could be applied by airline
personnel with a minimum of training and without interfering with
their responsibility of expediting the loading of passengers. After con-
siderable experimentation, it was found that a relatively small number
of such criteria could be used in combination to clear at least 99 per
cent of the passengers on the basis of information about them and their
observed behavior. It was eventually found that criteria could be estab-
lished which could clear 99.5 per cent before they reached the mag-
netometer. The magnetometer was about 50 per cent effective in clear-
ing otherwise uncleared persons because their magnetic signatures were
lower than a level that would indicate the presence of a weapon. The
psychological or behavioral criteria combined with the magnetometer,
then, became a two-element screening system that was 99.75 per cent
effective in clearing individuals regarded to be low risks as potential
hijackers. Other means, such as interviews and voluntary search, were
JUNE 1973] 1009
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used to process the remaining one-quarter of 1 per cent. The proportion
of the passengers who ultimately were denied passage was extremely
small, and a high percentage of these people carried weapons typical
of past hijackers. 6 The first year of operational experience by several
airlines with voluntary use of the profile and magnetometer system
showed it to be practical and suitable for widespread utilization by all
airlines.
B. Adapting the System to New Conditions
Since hijacking is a social phenomenon that is in the process of
evolution, with new ways of hijacking being developed and new desti-
nations being discovered, the types of hijackers will, of course, change
from time to time. Therefore, the psychological or behavioral profile
will need to be modified accordingly. There is also the problem of
maintaining the security of the behavioral profile criteria which ob-
viously would lose their effectiveness if they were made known to the
public. Since the subpopulation of hijackers is so distinctively different
from the population of air travelers, there is a very large number of
types of criteria that markedly differentiate between the two popula-
tions. Thus, as it becomes necessary, new factors can be introduced to
replace those compromised by a breach of security or made obsolete by
changes in the nature of the hijacking population. It would also be
possible to computerize the profile. This would make it possible to use
much more numerous and more sophisticated sets of criteria and would
make the whole process much less subject to security leaks.
A large number of foreign countries and airlines have expressed
interest in the Federal Aviation Administration's passenger screening
system. They have been briefed on the system, and it has been stressed
to them that the American psychological profile may not be directly
applicable in a foreign situation. However, there is reason to believe
that they could develop a similar system of their own after careful
studies of the observable aspects of their passengers' behavior. That
development would have to be based on their intelligence regarding the
group posing the threat.
C. Operational Results of the System
During the first 3 years in which the system was in operation, sev-
eral thousand arrests were made of individuals who were found either
to possess weapons or to be otherwise in violation of the law.3 7 In
addition, thousands of weapons have been removed from passengers
36. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); FINAL
REPORT, supra note 34, at pt. III.
37. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF ARRESTS
(1973).
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who were then permitted to board, and a number of weapons have been
discarded in various places near the loading area before boarding by
passengers who saw warning signs.3 ' There is evidence that several of
those arrested were planning to hijack the airplane they were attempting
to board.
3 9
The screening system became compulsory for all airlines in Feb-
ruary 1972.40 In January 1973 it was replaced by a screening system
under which all passengers are subject to a magnetometer screening
and a search of their carry-on luggage."
V. CONCLUSION
It was found that the screening system could be employed with
minimum disruption of operations of the airlines, with minimum per-
sonnel needed to operate the system, and with minimum undesirable
side effects, such as unfavorable public reaction. It was also found that
the passenger surveillance system seemed to be a positive and practical
means of minimizing the chance that potential hijackers would board
an aircraft without first being disarmed. During the early stages of
implementation of such a system, the greatest benefit comes from psy-
chological deterrence. However, as the coverage becomes substantial,
or even complete, the system becomes a positive preventive measure and
not just a deterrent.
The profile system was, of course, an interim system designed to
be appropriate for a lower level of emergency than now exists. It
was anticipated from the beginning that a 100 per cent screening sys-
tem would be required during periods of high levels of emergency. In
case of any future subsidence of the severity of the hijacking threat,
an interim system might again become appropriate.
It is possible to expand the basic approach to screening for threats
other than that of hijacking and also to develop similar systems for
other nations. In adapting the approach to other situations, it is neces-
sary to study the situation to develop a very clear idea of the nature
of the personnel posing the threat. It would be necessary also that such
a group of personnel be very distinctively different from the normal
traveling public. Further, the approach might be profitable for the prob-
lem of checked baggage, mail, and freight to the extent that it will be
possible to relate these articles to the people owning them and to classify
them in such a way as to enable searching or surveillance to be focused
on a small proportion of the total flow.
38. Id.
39. FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIR PIRACY SCOREBOARD REPORT (1972).
40. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973).
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